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Part VI
Understandings of Fundamental
Justice

Extradition, Assurances and
Human Rights:
Guidance from the Supreme Court of
Canada in India v. Badesha
Joanna Harrington*

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to
appeal in a surprising number of extradition cases concerning individuals in
Canada who are wanted for trial elsewhere. Leave has been granted in 18
cases since the 2001 unanimous decision of “The Court” in United States v.
Burns,1 which made extradition from Canada conditional on the receipt of
assurances from a foreign state that a death penalty will not be imposed and
thus, in substance, overturned the position taken by a divided Court 10
years earlier.2 Many intuitively connect extradition with criminal law, with
extradition being a process of request and surrender that is available only in
relation to a serious criminal charge.3 However, the judicial proceedings in
an extradition case are not criminal trials, and in Canada, these cases
typically involve challenges on either constitutional or administrative law
grounds, or a combination of both, to the decisions of committal and/or
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Thanks are due to Nikita Gush for research assistance, to the anonymous reviewers and Professor
Sonia Lawrence for helpful suggestions, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for financial support. I also thank Professor Rob Currie for our various
discussions over the years about extradition law.
1
[2001] S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”].
2
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kindler”]; Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.). Canada was later found in violation of the prohibition on cruel and inhuman
treatment for surrendering Ng to California to face execution by gas asphyxiation, a death that does
not occur with the least physical and mental suffering: Ng v. Canada, Communication No 469/1991,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/469/1991, (1993) 1-2 IHRR 161 (Hum. Rts. Cttee.).
3
Including extradition requests to secure a fugitive’s post-conviction return to prison.
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surrender that pave the way for an individual’s forced departure from
Canada. Indeed, many an extradition case is in fact a judicial review
application, put forward to challenge the exercise of state power in
circumstances where an individual’s liberty is at stake.
Inherent within these legal challenges are also arguments of public
international law, given the state-to-state nature of almost all
extradition requests,4 and the respect to be accorded to the legal
system of a foreign state that has been deemed worthy of an
extradition partnership by Canada’s federal executive branch. It is
presumed that the Executive makes an assessment of the standards of
law and justice in the foreign state before concluding an extradition
agreement, but such assessments are not made public.5 Nevertheless,
because of this desired respect, there was traditionally a rule or
doctrine of non-inquiry that was applied by courts to bar the judicial
authorities in one state from inquiring into the standards of law and
justice in another. Although still relevant within the United States,6 any
obligatory rule of non-inquiry has long been dead in Europe,7 and
suspected as such in Canada, given the application of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms8 to executive decision-making.9
Under Canadian law, the final decision on the surrender of a requested
individual is made not by a court, but at the discretion of a federal
Cabinet minister, specifically the Minister of Justice.10

4
One can also have state-to-international-criminal-tribunal requests under Canada’s
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, s. 9(1), as amended and Schedule [hereinafter “Extradition Act”].
5
This presumption does not account for the roll-over designation of a number of
Commonwealth states as extradition partners upon the repeal of the old Foreign Offenders Act with
the enactment of a new Extradition Act in 1999, nor does it account for subsequent changes in the
foreign state, including a revolution or coup d’état. Zimbabwe, for example, remains a designated
extradition partner under Canada’s Extradition Act, id., s. 9(1) and Schedule, despite the events
leading to its 2002 suspension, and then 2003 withdrawal, from the Commonwealth.
6
See, for example, John T. Parry, “International Extradition, the Rule of Non-inquiry, and
the Problem of Sovereignty” (2010) 90:5 B.U.L. Rev. 1973. For an earlier oft-cited work, see
Jacques Semmelman, “Federal Courts, the Constitution and the Rule of Non-inquiry in International
Extradition Proceedings” (1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1198. For a student note on the rule’s origins,
see Matthew Murchison, “Extradition’s Paradox: Duty, Discretion, and Rights in the World of Noninquiry” (2007) 43 Stan. J. Int’l L. 295.
7
As confirmed by the landmark judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in
Soering v. United Kingdom, Ser A No 161, (1989) 11 EHRR 439.
8
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
9
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.).
10
Extradition Act, s. 40(1).
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In India v. Badesha,11 an appeal heard in March 2017 and decided in
September of that year, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada confirmed
that yes, there is a role for inquiry in matters of extradition from Canada,
with the Charter requiring a human rights appraisal of the record and
practices of the foreign state making the extradition request. However, the
impact of that inquiry with respect to a challenge to a surrender decision is
likely to be tempered by considerations of reasonableness and the high
degree of deference accorded to ministers of the Crown in matters of
foreign affairs and international cooperation,12 with cooperation referring to
that in support of the prevention and prosecution of serious crime, rather
than cooperation in the protection of human rights.13 In other words, while
the Charter requires a human rights inquiry in matters of extradition,
principles of administrative law will limit its impact.
At issue in Badesha was an extradition request made by India to Canada
for the surrender of two Canadian citizens who are wanted for trial in India
on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder. Upon their arrest, the two
individuals raised concerns as to the nature of the treatment they would face
after surrender, focusing in particular on the likelihood of violence and
custodial mistreatment in India, as well as an alleged lack of access to
adequate medical treatment given their advanced ages and states of illhealth. The Minister of Justice then requested and received diplomatic
assurances from India to address these concerns, leading the legal challenge
to focus on whether, in light of such promises not to mistreat, it was
reasonable for the Minister to conclude that there was no substantial risk of
mistreatment that would offend the principles of fundamental justice under
section 7 of the Charter, or be otherwise unjust or oppressive under section
44(1)(a) of Canada’s Extradition Act. By a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeal
for British Columbia found the Minister’s decision to be unreasonable in the
circumstances,14 but the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed.
11

[2017] S.C.J. No. 44, 2017 SCC 44, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 127 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badesha”].
The Court attributes “superior expertise in Canada’s international relations and foreign
affairs” to the Minister, but fails to note that the office-holder under discussion is the Minister of
Justice, and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs: Badesha, id., at para. 39. By statute, it is the
Minister of Foreign Affairs who has the responsibility to “conduct all diplomatic and consular
relations on behalf of Canada” and “conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to
Canada”: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, S.C. 2013, c. 33, s. 10(2).
13
I have long argued that principles of comity and respect for international relations should
be interpreted to include respect for both a state’s extradition treaty obligations and its human rights
treaty obligations: Joanna Harrington, “The Role for Human Rights Obligations in Canadian
Extradition Law” [2005] 43 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 45.
14
India v. Badesha, [2016] B.C.J. No. 365, 2016 BCCA 88 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
“Badesha (BCCA)”].
12
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In this paper, I review the facts of the Badesha case, before examining
what one may term the “other facts” of relevance, namely the nature of
Canada’s extradition relationship with India and India’s record on human
rights observance. I then focus attention on Canada’s human rights
obligations, since it is Canada, not India, that must decide whether to
surrender in circumstances where there is a risk of future mistreatment,
leading to an analysis of whether assurances from the foreign state can be
relied upon so as to remove or mitigate any basis for finding Canada in
violation of its human rights obligations. In doing so, I refer to the
judicial use of various contextual factors to assess the reliability of a
diplomatic assurance, with Canada’s highest court having borrowed
heavily from the “deportation with assurances” jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, albeit a jurisprudential position that is
not without a particular context, nor criticism. Lastly, I consider the
territorial aspects of the crime underpinning the extradition request at
issue in Badesha, suggesting that Canada could, and should, have
prosecuted long ago the alleged orchestration of a contract killing by two
Canadians operating on Canadian soil, with Canada and India both
sharing in the desire and obligation to demonstrate that honour killings
will not be tolerated in a just and fair society. There is truth in the
aphorism that justice delayed is justice denied.

II. THE MURDER OF JASSI SIDHU AND THE EXTRADITION REQUEST
The facts of this case take the reader back a startling 18 years. On June
8, 2000, Jaswinder (Jassi) Kaur Sidhu, a 25-year-old beautician from Maple
Ridge, British Columbia, was murdered in a rural area in Punjab, India. She
was abducted, and later assaulted and stabbed, with her body left in a
ditch.15 Her husband, Sukhwinder (Mithu) Singh Sidhu, was also seriously
injured in the attack. An investigation by the Indian police led to the
prosecution before an Indian court of 11 individuals on charges of murder,
attempted murder and kidnapping to commit murder, resulting in seven
convictions, although four of the seven were later acquitted on appeal.16
Through their investigation, the Indian police also obtained evidence
indicating that two members of Jassi Sidhu’s family in Canada were
involved in her murder, evidence that led to cooperation between the Indian
15
Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 8. See further “Timeline of events surrounding so-called
‘honour killing’ of Jassi Sidhu” The Canadian Press (May 9, 2014) [hereinafter “Timeline of events”].
16
Badesha, id., at para. 10.

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

EXTRADITION, ASSURANCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277

authorities and the division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that
provides federal, provincial and municipal policing services throughout
British Columbia.
Eleven plus years after the murder on June 8, 2000, warrants were
issued under Canada’s Extradition Act authorizing the arrest on January 6,
2012 of Jassi Sidhu’s mother, Malkit Kaur Sidhu, and her maternal uncle,
Surjit Singh Badesha.17 Of Punjabi descent, both individuals have long
been Canadian citizens. They resided in a large family compound in the city
of Maple Ridge, and were aged 63 and 67 respectively at the time of their
arrest. It is not alleged that they played any physical role in the attack that
took place in India. Their extradition was sought on a charge of conspiracy
to commit murder, it being alleged by the Indian authorities that the mother
and uncle, having prospered in Canada through farming, had disapproved
of Jassi Sidhu’s secret marriage in India to a rickshaw driver from a poor
family, and arranged an honour killing by hiring hit-men to carry out the
attack.18 It has also been reported that the uncle as patriarch and lead
decision-maker for the family had made plans for an arranged marriage for
Jassi Sidhu with a much older businessman.19
This case has attracted much public interest, particularly in the Lower
Mainland region of British Columbia. Media coverage helped spawn a
petition website and a book, both entitled “Justice for Jassi”,20 as well as
several documentaries,21 a made-for-TV movie22 and a self-described
“angry” rebuke of a judicial decision barring extradition, absent stronger
safeguards, by a former British Columbia attorney general and premier, also

17

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Media Release, “Arrests Made in Jassi Sidhu
Homicide” (January 6, 2012); Kim Bolan, “Charges at Last Against Mother and Uncle of Jassi
Sidhu” Vancouver Sun (January 7, 2012); Andrea Woo, “B.C. police arrest mother, uncle linked to
cold case murder” Vancouver Sun (January 9, 2012). See also Fabian Dawson, “Jassi Sidhu: The
tragedy of a forbidden love” The Province (September 10, 2017).
18
Badesha, supra, note 11, at paras. 1-2, 8-9.
19
“B.C. victim of alleged honour killing was hit, threatened, friend testifies” The Canadian
Press (May 29, 2013); “Mother and uncle in alleged ‘honour killing’ trial threatened daughter’s
secret husband with death: Crown” The Canadian Press (January 15, 2014); “Timeline of events”,
supra, note 15.
20
See further <http://justiceforjassi.com/>. The 2002 book was co-authored by journalists
with strong ties with the South Asian community in the Lower Mainland, including Fabian Dawson,
the now-retired deputy editor of The Province newspaper, and Harbinder Singh Sewak, the publisher
of the South Asian Post, described as Canada’s premier English-language Indo-Canadian newspaper.
21
CBC, “The Fifth Estate: Murdered Bride”, aired November 1, 2001; CBC, “The Fifth
Estate: Escape from Justice”, aired January 6, 2012.
22
Murder Unveiled (2005), directed by Vic Sarin, online: Internet Movie Database (IMDb)
<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0758922/>.
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of Indian descent.23 As for the timeline of the judicial proceedings, on May
9, 2014, an extradition judge found the evidence to be sufficient to commit
Badesha and Sidhu to await surrender, with that evidence including
extensive telephone records as well as testimony from Jassi Sidhu’s friends
and co-workers.24 On November 14, 2014, the Minister of Justice made the
orders for surrender, advising that these orders were conditional on the
receipt of assurances from India regarding the treatment of Badesha and
Sidhu. On January 18, 2015, the Minister advised that the desired
assurances had been received.
Badesha and Sidhu then applied to the British Columbia Court of
Appeal to quash the orders for surrender, arguing that the assurances were
“insufficient to protect them from the death penalty, a corrupt trial, or from
violence, torture and neglect of their medical care while they are in
custody”.25 Both were suffering from age-related health conditions that
required medical care not available in prison, with both having been
detained in custody since their arrest in 2012 to ensure the safety of
witnesses.26 A majority of the Court of Appeal ruled that the Minister’s
decision to accept the assurances was not reasonable, suggesting a need for
more meaningful ways to “transform India’s good intentions into realistic
protection.”27 Leave to appeal was then granted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in August 2016, with the Attorney General of Canada acting on
behalf of the Republic of India as the appellant, leading eventually to the
Court’s restoration of the surrender orders on September 8, 2017.
Badesha and Sidhu, however, remained in Canada. On September 21,
2017, the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed to hear a judicial review
application in relation to the Minister’s refusal to reconsider the decision to
surrender, with counsel alleging that new information of relevance had been
provided while the case was on appeal.28 It is further alleged that the
Minister committed an abuse of process by way of an attempt to whisk
Badesha and Sidhu out of the country, moving them from Vancouver to

23
Ujjal Dosanjh, “Extradition rejection for accused in Jassi Sidhu case denies justice to this
murdered woman” The Province (February 27, 2016).
24
India v. Badesha, [2014] B.C.J. No. 910, 2014 BCSC 807 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
“Badesha (BCSC)”].
25
Badesha (BCCA), supra, note 14, at para. 4.
26
See further the application for bail in India v. Badesha, [2014] B.C.J. No. 2882, 2014
BCCA 452, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.).
27
Badesha (BCCA), supra, note 14, at para. 65.
28
India v. Sidhu, [2017] B.C.J. No. 1876, 2017 BCCA 333 (B.C.C.A.).
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Toronto without advance notice to their counsel.29 (Under the terms of the
extradition treaty, advance notice is provided to India).30 A hearing of this
application was scheduled for April 2018, but it has been delayed due to
demands for disclosure.31 Meanwhile, in March 2018, in a decision
concerning the sponsored immigration to Canada of one of the perpetrators
of the 2000 attack, who was eventually acquitted by the Indian Supreme
Court, we find further confirmation that the murder of Jassi Sidhu was
orchestrated by telephone calls to and from her family in Canada.32

III. THE OTHER FACTS
There are, however, other facts of relevance, most notably the facts of
India’s human rights record given the nature of the concerns raised in the
appeal by Badesha and Sidhu. In the section below, I examine the facts of
that record as found in the reports of several international human rights
monitoring mechanisms established by states. One could also draw on
reports by reputable non-governmental organizations, but given the judicial
respect to be accorded to comity in international relations, assessments
from bodies created by governments may carry greater weight. I also
examine the nature of Canada’s extradition treaty with India given that
there is always judicial interest in any extradition case in the maintenance
of Canada’s extradition relationships, with the courts having long accepted
that extradition “is founded on the concepts of ‘reciprocity, comity and
respect for differences in other jurisdictions’”.33 In truth, both aspects
involve matters of fact and law, with extradition treaties, like human rights
treaties, imposing legally binding international obligations that are
transformed into domestic law obligations through the Extradition Act and
the Charter.

29
See further Jason Proctor, “One last, last chance: Accused in honour killing case appeal
for clemency” CBC News (January 17, 2018). See also Douglas Quan, “Canada worked with India in
attempt to ‘secretly’ extradite honour killing suspects: Defence lawyers” National Post (January 10,
2018).
30
Extradition Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of India,
February 6, 1987, Can T.S. 1987 No. 14 (entered into force February 10, 1987), art. 12(2)
[hereinafter “Canada-India Extradition Treaty”].
31
India v. Sidhu, [2018] B.C.J. No. 107, 2018 BCCA 25 (B.C.C.A.).
32
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh Sidhu, [2018] F.C.J. No. 298,
2018 FC 306, at paras. 4-14 (F.C.) [hereinafter “Singh Sidhu”]. See also Douglas Quan, “Man
mistakenly got permanent residency” National Post (March 21, 2018).
33
Kindler, supra, note 2, at 844, cited in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 35.
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1. The Canada-India Extradition Treaty
Canada and India entered into formal extradition relations in 1987,34
although Canada had extradited an individual to India in 1985 without a
treaty in place.35 The conclusion of a treaty to secure reciprocal extradition
obligations was motivated by a desire, to quote the treaty’s preamble, “to
make more effective the cooperation of the two countries in the
suppression of crime.” It was also described as one of several “concrete
steps … necessary to combat terrorism,”36 with both governments keen to
enable Indian extradition requests for Canadian-based “Sikh extremists”
seeking an independent homeland in India’s northern state of Punjab.37 To
explain further, India had been seeking such a treaty with both Canada and
the United Kingdom in light of their large Sikh diaspora populations,38
with the Air India bombing of 1985 contributing to Canada’s desire to
comply. Confirmation that this focus was the motivation for the treaty’s
conclusion can be found in the writings of the Right Honourable Joe Clark,
who served as Canada’s foreign minister at the time.39
Given its link to counter-terrorism efforts, it is unlikely that the breach
of an assurance from India concerning either Badesha or Sidhu would lead
to “the possible termination of Canada’s extradition treaty with India”.40
This is not to say, however, that the treaty cannot be used for nonterroristic crimes. Indeed, India’s public posting of a list of the individuals
it has extradited to foreign countries indicating a total of six extraditions to
Canada, three for drug offences, two for murder and one for sexual abuse
of children, with these extraditions taking place between 2002 and 2007.41
No equivalent record is made publicly available by Canada.
As for India’s efforts vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, these eventually
led to the adoption of an India-United Kingdom extradition treaty in

34

Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30.
SI/85-190, Canada Gazette, Part II, vol. 119:23, November 13, 1985.
36
Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, Preamble.
37
Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Random House
Canada, 2013), at 61 [hereinafter “Clark”]; Darsham Singh Tatia, The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for
Statehood (London: UCL Press, 1999), at 189 [hereinafter “Tatia”].
38
See further Tatia, id., esp. 159-64, 171-76, 189-90.
39
Clark, supra, note 37, at 61. Press reports confirm that Joe Clark, as Secretary of State for
External Affairs, had visited India in December 1985 to express Canadian interest in negotiating an
extradition treaty: “Canadian Official in New Delhi” The New York Times (December 15, 1985).
40
A measure suggested by the Court in Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 19.
41
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “List of Fugitives Extradited to
Foreign Countries” (updated as of March 5, 2018), online: <http://www.mea.gov.in/byindia.htm>.
35
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1992.42 However, in contrast with Canada, which made its treaty with
India by executive action and without review by Parliament, parliamentary
action was required to enable the United Kingdom to ratify its extradition
treaty with India. The points raised during the parliamentary debate
prompted the minister responsible to make repeated reference to the “firm
assurances” provided by the Indian Government to address concerns about
India’s respect for human rights.43
An extradition treaty imposes on its parties a “duty to extradite” upon
request, provided the request meets the treaty’s conditions. The CanadaIndia Extradition Treaty is no different in this respect,44 with a doublecriminality provision requiring the extradition offence to be punishable by
the laws in both countries by at least one year’s imprisonment.45 Various
grounds for refusing a request are then included in the Treaty. However,
the terms of India’s extradition treaties with both Canada and the United
Kingdom weaken the role for an exception to extradition for political
offences46 — an exception found in many extradition treaties47 — with the
Canada-India Extradition Treaty including an additional safeguard to
secure timely trials.48 The other notable feature found in each of the two
extradition treaties with India concerns the use of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, with provision made to extend the treaty’s application, on a
reciprocal basis, to offences “committed outside the territory but within the
jurisdiction” of the state making the extradition request.49 As explained by
42
Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India, September 22, 1992, UKTS 1994
No. 13 (entered into force November 15, 1993) [hereinafter “India-UK Extradition Treaty”]. To
date, only one extradition from the United Kingdom to India has taken place, and that occurred with
the consent of the individual concerned, while other extradition requests have been barred by the
British courts on human rights grounds; a situation that has attracted comment in the Indian
Parliament and press. See, for example, Press Trust of India, “UK rejects 2 Indian extradition
requests” The Economic Times (Times of India) (November 5, 2017).
43
United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, July 21, 1993, vol. 229, cc. 445-69. The
order giving legal effect to the treaty was adopted by a divided House by a vote of 123 to 38: United
Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, July 21, 1993, vol. 229, cc. 468.
44
Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 1.
45
Id., art. 3.
46
Id., art. 5; India-UK Extradition Treaty, supra, note 42, art. 5.
47
See, e.g., Model Treaty on Extradition, GA Res 45/116, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1990),
art. 3 [hereinafter “Model Treaty on Extradition”].
48
Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 4(4) (“the requesting state shall
ensure that the person extradited is brought to trial within 6 months of the extradition”). But see art.
4(5), which provides for bail to be considered and the setting of a trial date “where trial has not
commenced within 6 months”.
49
Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 2. See also India-UK Extradition
Treaty, supra, note 42, arts. 3 and 6.
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the Minister of State for the Home Office to the British Parliament, this
extension of jurisdiction meant that “[t]hose who organize crimes from this
country cannot be allowed to escape the consequences, simply because
their intention was to see a very serious crime committed in another
country.”50 Both treaties also contain the usual direction that an extradition
request may be refused if the person sought is being proceeded against in
the requested state;51 an exception of relevance if Canada had opted to
prosecute the conspiracy that took place on a transnational basis in both
Canada and India, allegedly orchestrated by two Canadian citizens from
their home in Canada, that resulted in the kidnapping, assault and murder
of a third Canadian citizen, while she was in India.
2. India’s Human Rights Record
The human rights record of the state making an extradition request is
also a relevant consideration, with the Supreme Court of Canada having
made clear that when evaluating whether an individual will face a
substantial risk of ill-treatment in the requesting state, “it logically follows
that the Minister can consider evidence of the general human rights
situation in that state, which may include reports from reputable
government and non-government organizations”.52 (Presumably, reports by
inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, may also be
considered.) While the focus of this “fact-driven inquiry” remains on the
“personal risk” faced by an individual,53 “general evidence of pervasive
and systematic human rights abuses in a receiving state can form the basis
for a finding that the person faces a substantial risk”.54 The Court found
support for this proposition in the famous case of Chahal v. United
Kingdom,55 albeit that in that case, a Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights had barred the deportation of a Sikh separatist
leader from Britain to India on the basis of a serious risk of future
ill-treatment having been established by reference to reports of persistent
problems of human rights abuses by the Indian police and security
50
United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates (July 21, 1993), vol. 229, cc. 449-50
(David Maclean).
51
Canada-India Extradition Treaty, supra, note 30, art. 5(2)(2); India-UK Extradition
Treaty, supra, note 42, art. 8; Model Treaty on Extradition, supra, note 47, art. 4(c).
52
Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 44.
53
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002
SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”].
54
Badesha, supra, note 11, at para. 45.
55
App. No. 22414/93, (1997), 23 E.H.R.R. 413 (G.C.).
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forces.56 The Grand Chamber was also “not persuaded” that an assurance
provided by the Indian Government “would provide Mr Chahal with an
adequate guarantee of safety.”57
India is a party to the two leading international human rights treaties of
general application, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)58 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),59 as well as human rights treaties of specific
application to matters of racial discrimination, women’s rights, children’s
rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. As a state party, India is
bound to respect the ICCPR’s prohibition on torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,60 as well as the
provisions on the rights to life and a fair trial.61 India is also bound by
the ICESCR’s recognition of “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”62 In its
judgment in Badesha, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that India
was a party to the ICCPR as a factor relevant to the assessment of the risk
of torture or mistreatment faced by Badesha and Sidhu.63 But the Court
failed to note that these treaties also entail state acceptance of an
international monitoring process, and that India had long stopped reporting
on the performance of its ICCPR obligations to that treaty’s monitoring
body, known as the Human Rights Committee.64 Indeed, India’s last report
to this independent international body was made in November 1995, with
the Committee ordering the next report to be submitted by the end of
2001.65 The desired report has yet to materialize 18 years later, with such
disregard hardly a sign of an Indian commitment to respecting its treaty
obligations.
An even more worrisome sign is India’s long-standing inability to
secure the domestic change it needs to be in a position to become a party to
the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
56
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment,66 with India aware that its failure to
ratify this treaty has provided a ground for the judicial refusal of a desired
extradition from Denmark.67 As a non-party to this widely ratified treaty
setting universal minimum standards, India stands with Angola, Iran,
Malaysia, North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as several small
states such as Haiti, Papua New Guinea, and Suriname. India signed this
treaty in 1997, 10 years after the treaty’s international entry into force and
in fulfilment of an election commitment made by a coalition government
in 1996.68 However, as a legal matter, signature is not the same as
ratification for many multilateral treaties, with a mere signatory not being
bound by the treaty’s provisions, absent a general obligation to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.69 While
disagreement may arise as to what is a treaty’s object and purpose, as a
signatory, rather than a party, India is not bound by the treaty’s express
extension of its prohibitions and protections to “other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture”,70 and nor is India subject to the international scrutiny of its
actions by an independent treaty-monitoring body, in this case, the
Committee Against Torture.71
“India’s efforts to enact domestic legislation that would enable them to
ratify the CAT,” (referring to the Treaty rather than the Committee),
receive a brief mention in Badesha,72 but without further context. As noted
above, the wait for action has been for some 20 years, with the
insufficiency of India’s efforts documented in India’s own reports to the
United Nations Human Rights Council, prepared for the examination of its
human rights record by other states as part of what is called the “universal
periodic review”. In its 2008 report, India identified itself as a signatory to
66
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the treaty, but made no mention of any plans to enact domestic legislation
to pave the way for ratification.73 In its 2012 report, India explained that a
bill introduced in Parliament in 2010 had failed to attract the support of the
upper house (Rajya Sabha) and was instead “referred to a Parliamentary
Select Committee which had made certain recommendations.”74 In its
2017 report, India again indicated its commitment to ratifying the treaty,
but noted that “the Law Commission of India is examining the changes
required to domestic law prior to ratification.”75 As for the role of the
judiciary in serving, in India’s words, “as a bulwark against … violations”
of the torture provisions of the Indian Penal Code,76 a recent U.S.
government report refers to a “two-fold rise in reported custodial death and
police torture cases” and government inaction in the face of court orders.77

IV. CANADA’S HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Canada is a party to the Convention Against Torture, and thus unlike
India, Canada accepts both an international legal obligation to extradite
upon request under an extradition treaty and an international legal
obligation not to extradite where there are substantial grounds for
believing the individual will be in danger of being subjected to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.78 The latter is often referred to as an
obligation of non-refoulement; refouler being a French verb for return,
force or push back. These treaty obligations have been transformed into
Canadian law obligations, through the Extradition Act and the Charter,
with the Supreme Court of Canada having held that section 7 of the
Charter “should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of
protection as found in Canada’s international commitments regarding
non-refoulement to torture or other gross human rights violations”.79 In
73
National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15(a) of the annex to Human
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other words, as the Court has emphasized in Badesha, “surrendering a
person to face a substantial risk of torture or mistreatment in the
requesting state will violate the principles of fundamental justice.”80
However, in assessing whether there is a substantial risk of torture or
mistreatment, the Minister of Justice may take into account any
assurances made by the requesting state regarding the treatment to be
faced by the requested persons, despite the absence of any means to
guarantee in law that these assurances will be respected by the foreign
state, or enforced by the local courts.
Extradition on assurance, or conditional extradition, is not new in
Canada, with the Court in 2001 recognizing a Charter-derived obligation
in capital cases to secure an assurance from the requesting state that a
death sentence will not be imposed.81 However, the death penalty,
although heavily circumscribed, remains a lawful penalty under
international law, whereas the serious mistreatment of a human being is a
universal illegality, with the prohibition on torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment being absolute in
nature, and permitting of no exceptions, under both customary and
conventional international law.82 This distinction was expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court in 2001,83 but in Badesha, the Court
has confirmed that diplomatic assurances “need not eliminate any
possibility of torture or mistreatment; they must simply form a
reasonable basis for the Minister’s finding that there is no substantial risk
of torture or mistreatment.”84
As for how one determines the reliability of a diplomatic assurance,
and thus its sufficiency in removing a substantial risk of ill-treatment, a
contextual approach must be taken, involving the consideration of
multiple factors. The mere fact that Canada has felt moved to ask another
state to promise not to torture cannot be treated as proof that a risk exists,
with the Supreme Court accepting that assurances “may be requested by
the Minister out of an abundance of caution”.85 It has also been argued
that assurances can serve to reduce the risk of torture by regulating the
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behaviour of the assuring state,86 with Canada having made public its
view, by way of a joint submission to the Committee Against Torture,87
that “when used appropriately, diplomatic assurances have served as an
effective tool for States Parties to help ensure compliance with Article 3”
of the Convention Against Torture on non-refoulement. The joint
submission, however, focused on assurances from states parties, with a
non-party state bound by a customary international law prohibition, but
shielded from any scrutiny by the treaty-monitoring body by virtue of its
non-party status.
As for the contextual factors to consider, Canada’s highest court has
adopted the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in the Othman
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, even though that case
concerned the long desired deportation of a non-national from Britain to
Jordan on national security grounds.88 Indeed, in the Othman case,
Britain had recognized that there is an absolute legal bar on surrendering
a person to face serious ill-treatment, while also recognizing that the risk
Othman posed to the British public, as an alleged radical Islamic cleric
intent on encouraging terrorism, required restrictions on his liberty until
a lawful surrender could be arranged. This additional context helps
explain the European Court’s view in 2012 that “States must be allowed
to deport non-nationals whom they consider to be threats to national
security,”89 leading to the suggestion (or criticism) of a compromise to
support, in the Court’s words, “a firm stand against those who contribute
to terrorist acts.”90 It is also a context that could be used to distinguish
Othman from Badesha since the latter is not a national security case, nor
a case of alleged terrorism, nor a case concerning the surrender of nonnationals. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has found the
factors identified in Othman to assess the assurance to have general
86
Jeffrey G. Johnston, “The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use
of Diplomatic Assurances to Protect against Torture after 9/11” (2011) 11 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 1.
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Joint Observations of Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America on Paragraphs 19-20 of the Committee Against Torture’s Draft General Comment No. 1
(2017) on Implementation of Article 3 in the Context of Article 22, dated March 31, 2017, online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CAT/GCArticle3/JointSubmission.pdf> [hereinafter
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relevance. These factors include such matters as who within the foreign
state has provided the assurance and on what terms of specificity, as well
as the receiving state’s record in abiding by similar assurances, in
addition to whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively
verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, and
whether there is an effective system of protection in the receiving state,
defined to include a state’s cooperation with international monitoring
mechanisms.91
In and of themselves, these contextual factors are not problematic,
and indeed, their detailed exposition by the courts serves to require
governments to do more than accept an assurance on mere face value.
But the real test lies in the application of this exhortation, and a court’s
willingness to scrutinize a government’s assessment so as to ensure a
degree of robustness in judicial review that is in keeping with the
absolute nature of the right to be free from serious mistreatment. It is on
this aspect where the Supreme Court of Canada disappoints, relying on
past holdings that “[t]he role of a reviewing court … is not to re-assess
the relevant facts and substitute its own view for that of the Minister”
and that the court “must examine whether the decision falls within a
range of reasonable outcomes.”92 Nevertheless, the Court did come to the
view that the majority of the Court of Appeal “did not consider many of
the relevant factors the Minister considered in assessing the reliability of
the assurance.”93 It also found the Court of Appeal to have been
dismissive of the role for consular monitoring.94
And yet, the Supreme Court of Canada provided no comment on the
fact that in Othman, the assurances were provided by a state party to the
Convention Against Torture, with Jordan having acceded to that treaty in
1991. Nor did the Court draw a link between its mention of rights
protection by way of “cooperation with international monitoring
mechanisms” and India’s complete disregard of its reporting obligation
to the Human Rights Committee since 2001. India, as a non-party state,
is also not subject to any monitoring by the Committee Against Torture,
which has developed a specific expertise with non-refoulement claims
since they constitute the great majority of its caseload. The existence and
terms of the assurances used to secure Othman’s deportation to Jordan
91
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were also given public exposure, with publicity being an encouragement
for compliance, whereas in Canada, past access-to-information requests
for diplomatic assurances have been refused on the basis of a
discretionary exemption for “diplomatic correspondence exchanged with
foreign states”.95 Moreover, in the Othman case, the assurances
negotiated by way of memoranda of understanding eventually formed the
basis of a legally binding treaty,96 with Othman voluntarily consenting to
his surrender if that treaty, with its guarantees of fair treatment and a fair
trial, was ratified by the Jordanian Parliament and endorsed by the
Jordanian King.97 Upon those terms, Othman, or Abu Qatada as he is also
known, was indeed surrendered to Jordan.98

V. THE TERRITORIAL CONNECTION
The Minister of Justice has taken the view that the extradition of
Badesha and Sidhu must take place so that India can see “justice done on
India’s territory”,99 and the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that
it remains “a basic principle of extradition law that when a person is
alleged to have committed a crime in another country, he or she should
expect to be answerable to that country’s justice system”.100 No mention
is made of India’s (and Canada’s) acceptance in its treaty relationship of
extraterritorial jurisdiction as a means to foreclose a perpetrator’s evasion
from prosecution. Moreover, there remains the question as to, on whose
territory did the crime of conspiracy to commit murder occur or given
the transnational context of this case, on whose territories? The facts
suggest an agreement to conspire may well have been made between the
95
Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, s. 15(1)(h). See also Do-Ky v. Canada
(Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), [1999] F.C.J. No. 673, 173 D.L.R. 4th 515,
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mother and uncle in Canada, and at the direction of the mother and/or
uncle by telephone with and through relatives in India, possibly backed
by the promise of support for a family-class immigration application to
Canada.101
Canadian prosecutors may tend to favour a traditional approach to
jurisdiction, preferring that prosecutions take place in the territory where
a crime was completed.102 However, Canadian law has long accepted a
broader view of territorial jurisdiction, enabling the prosecution in
Canada of transnational crime where there is a “real and substantial link”
between the offence and Canada.103 According to the extradition judge,
certified telephone records establish “extensive contact” between
Badesha’s telephone number in Canada and the four principals in India
before, on the day of, and after the killing in June 2000.104 Indeed, the
extradition judge found there were 266 calls, lasting a total of 18 hours
and 13 minutes,105 lending support to the view that a conspiracy took
place on Canadian soil, orchestrated by at least one Canadian citizen,
with the aim to have another Canadian citizen killed while she was
outside the country. In the view of the Minister of Justice, “much, if not
all” of the evidence needed to prosecute Badesha was available in
India.106 However, according to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, “a
substantial body of evidence exists in Canada”,107 with a Canadian
prosecution, and not impunity, being the alternative when an extradition
is barred by serious human rights concerns. This aspect of extradition
law has long been encapsulated by the Latin maxim aut dedere aut
judicare (“either extradite or prosecute”), embraced in the writings of the
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius since the 1600s,108 and today codified in
various treaties.109 For more creative thinkers, a third option may also
101
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exist, involving the negotiation of the temporary surrender of a Canadian
national for trial in a foreign state on condition or assurance that they
will be returned to serve any sentence of imprisonment in Canada. This
option finds recognition in the revised United Nations Model Treaty on
Extradition,110 and in a long-standing pan-European extradition
arrangement.111 The existence of this option of temporary surrender and
return for imprisonment is also acknowledged in several widely ratified
multilateral extradition arrangements to which Canada and India are
party.112

VI. CONCLUSION
It is a welcome development that extradition law in Canada no longer
speaks of safe havens and rules of non-inquiry but instead embraces the
December 4, 1969). See also the survey of multilateral instruments containing an “extradite or
prosecute” provision prepared by the Secretariat to assist the International Law Commission in its
study of this topic: U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/630 (2010). Bilaterally, the “extradite or prosecute” principle
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submits the case to its national prosecuting authorities; an option typically provided by treaty. See,
for example, art. 3(2) of the Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the Republic of France, December 17, 1988, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 38 (entered into
force December 1, 1989).
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view that the extradition process also serves to protect the rights of the
persons sought.113 These rights are best protected when the Charter is
interpreted so as to require the Minister to conduct a meaningful
appraisal of the human rights record of the requesting state, including its
willingness to subject that record to independent third party monitoring.
After all, would not all countries comply if they were simply asked to
assure us that they will not mistreat? It is worrisome that a country
committed to a principled foreign policy does not insist that its
extradition partners be parties to the Convention Against Torture. This
treaty provides more than support for the customary rule that prohibits
the sending of an individual to face a substantial risk of serious illtreatment. It also imposes a legal requirement for regular state reporting
to an independent, international, treaty-monitoring body, with monitoring
mechanisms, whether consular or otherwise, viewed as an important
safeguard to enhance the reliability of a diplomatic assurance.114 State
acceptance of post-surrender monitoring could also be a term written into
an extradition treaty, for example, with an Australian parliamentary
scrutiny committee having made recommendations, repeatedly, for the
inclusion of public monitoring and annual status reports on extradited
persons to address concerns about human rights observance in a foreign
state.115
As for lessons to be learned from India v. Badesha, it would be wise
for future legal challenges to extradition decisions to focus on forms of
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, rather than
claims of torture. With torture being at the very apex of the spectrum of
all forms of mistreatment, it may well be difficult to prove that an
individual faces a substantial risk of torture upon surrender, while
challenges about the weakness of the evidence are even less likely to
succeed, absent a case that suggests gross violations of the right to a fair
trial. But the real obstacle for a future legal challenge will be the
113
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readiness of a court to scrutinize a government’s assessment of the risk,
with a heightened level of judicial review surely justified by the absolute
nature of the right to be free from serious mistreatment. As for Badesha
and Sidhu, Canada may well have wanted to support India in a show of
resolve to prosecute those who commit honour killings, a practice that
endangers the lives of so many women who fear retribution from their
families for marrying an individual of a different caste or religion. Sadly,
however, honour killings also occur in Canada,116 calling for a similar
Canadian resolve. “Justice for Jassi”, in the sense of a judicial
proceeding, however, may ultimately be denied, with Badesha and Sidhu
now in their 70s and in poor health.
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